The right to an impartial judge is so sacred that the United States Supreme Court has declared a violation of this right to be "structural" error.

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NUMBER 13-07-733-CR COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG JUAN ANTONIO HERNANDEZ, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. On appeal from the 197th District Court of Cameron County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Benavides Opinion by Justice Yañez Appellant, Juan Antonio Hernandez, was indicted for the offense of robbery, (1) with an enhancement for a prior felony conviction. (2) After a bench trial, Hernandez was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment. In three issues, Hernandez asserts that (1) he did not intelligently waive his right to a jury trial; (2) his conviction is based on insufficient evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in refusing to consider the full range of punishment available when determining his sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part. I. Legal Sufficiency We begin by addressing Hernandez's second issue on appeal because it affords him the greatest relief if sustained. (3) In his second issue, Hernandez claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Hernandez does not state whether he is raising a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, or both. He sets out no standards of review. The State contends that we should find this issue waived for inadequate briefing. (4) We decline to waive the issue, and shall address it as a legal sufficiency challenge because, at the conclusion of Hernandez's argument, he states that affording him relief on this issue would prohibit the State for retrying him for robbery. (5) If it was Hernandez's intent to raise a factual sufficiency challenge, that challenge is waived. (6) 1. Applicable Law In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict in order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (7) This standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. (8) The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. (9) Thus, when performing a legal sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. (10) We must resolve any inconsistencies in the evidence in favor of the finding of guilt. (11) To prove that Hernandez was guilty of robbery, the State had to prove that Hernandez, "in the course of committing theft as defined in Chapter 31 and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property," either: "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another," or (2) "intentionally or knowingly threaten[ed] or place[ed] another in fear of imminent bodily injury or death." (12) The penal code defines theft as unlawfully appropriating property with intent to deprive the owner of the property. (13) Bodily injury is "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." (14) This definition is broadly construed to include "even relatively minor physical contacts so long as they constitute more than mere offensive touching." (15) In the case of robbery, the bodily injury element is satisfied when "violence is clearly perpetrated against another for the purpose of . . . preventing or overcoming resistance to theft." (16) 2. Discussion Hernandez's brief only asserts that there is legally insufficient evidence that Hernandez "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to another." (17) This assertion, however, is refuted by the testimony of Juan Jose Moron, who, as loss prevention officer at J.C. Penney, intercepted Hernandez as he walked out of J.C. Penny with unpaid merchandise. Moron testified that he and Hernandez got "into a scuffle," during which time Hernandez "was pushing and tr[ying] to get away." As a result of the pushing, Moron suffered injuries to his nose, shoulder, right wrist, and left hand. Based on Moron's testimony, we find there is legally sufficient evidence that Hernandez intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Moron. Accordingly, we overrule Hernandez's second issue. II. Waiver of Jury Trial Article 1.13(a) of the code of criminal procedure provides, in relevant part, that the defendant "shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by jury, conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defendant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the attorney representing the State." (18) Hernandez's open court waiver occurred in the following manner: THE COURT: You can have a jury trial or a bench trial. Which one do you want? [HERNANDEZ]: What is a bench trial? THE COURT: The judge makes the decision. [HERNANDEZ]: You can make the decision for me, ma'am. MS. CHURCH: All right. Then we will do a bench trial. (19) Hernandez thus waived his right to a jury trial in open court by electing to communicate any waiver through his counsel, Ms. Church. The record further reveals that Hernandez made his waiver in a writing, which stated: COMES NOW Juan Antonio Hernandez, the Defendant in the above entitled and numbered cause, a felony less than capital, in person and in writing in open Court, and with the consent and approval of the Court and with the written and signed consent and approval of the attorney representing the State, and prior to the entering of a plea herein, waives the right of a trial by jury, both as to the issue of guilt or innocence and as to the punishment therefor, should be convicted. (20) Hernandez argues, however, that "the record does not show that the Court explained the dangers of proceeding with a bench trial, nor the fact that the Court would determine punishment. Instead, the Court informed [him] that he could not elect to have a jury determine punishment because he had previously been convicted a [sic] felony." (21) Hernandez does not specify what "dangers" the trial court should have discussed with him. And though the record does not reflect that the trial court told Hernandez that it would be determining punishment, Hernandez's written waiver indicates his awareness of this matter. As for the trial court informing Hernandez "that he could not elect to have a jury determine punishment," this did not occur. Hernandez directs us to the following pretrial discussion between the State, the trial court, and his counsel, Ms. Church: MS. CHURCH: Your Honor, I do have an election of punishment that I think is in the file, but I'm not sure, so I will hand this to the court. [THE STATE]: Your Honor, just for the record, that motion does say election for punishment by a jury and application for probation. As the court is aware, he has a prior conviction and with a prior conviction he is not eligible for probation. MS. CHURCH: That's why there is no affidavit attached. THE COURT: Okay. Since he's not eligible, he doesn't get to make that choice. MS. CHURCH: No. We disagree with Hernandez's contention that the trial court's reference to him not getting "to make that choice" represented the court instructing him that he could not elect to have the jury determine punishment. It is clear to this Court that the trial court was referring to Hernandez's inability to bring the issue of probation before a jury. Accordingly, with the record showing that the requirements of article 1.13 were satisfied, and without any legitimate basis for questioning whether the waiver was voluntary and intelligent, we overrule Hernandez's first issue on appeal. III. Failure to Consider Full Range of Punishment In his third issue, Hernandez argues that the trial court "denied him due process" by failing to consider the full range of available punishment when determining his sentence. (22) According to Hernandez, the trial court failed to consider the full range of punishment because the trial court had a policy of sentencing repeat offenders to double the time he or she had previously been sentenced. Hernandez thus contends that the trial court sentenced him to twenty-four years' imprisonment because he had previously been sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment for a different offense. 1. The Trial Record At a pretrial hearing held on September 11, 2007, Hernandez's counsel had the following exchange with the trial court: MS. CHURCH: And Your Honor, is it--I have tried to explain to my client that it's the standard operating procedure in this Court that if a person has gotten like twelve years in prison before-- THE COURT: I double it. MS. CHURCH: You double it. THE COURT: Whatever the highest one you have, I double. Okay? MS. CHURCH: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yes, thank you. You're welcome. Ask the other prisoners in jail, they will tell you. Anything else? MS. CHURCH: That's all we have, Judge. At another pretrial hearing held on November 5, 2007, Ms. Church again discussed with the trial court her attempts to explain to Hernandez the court's policy of doubling punishment. The trial court made no attempt to disavow Ms. Church's statements. The trial court found Hernandez guilty on November 15, 2007. The trial court asked Hernandez if he had previously been sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, and he answered in the affirmative. The State and Ms. Church then expressed their opinions as to what punishment should be assessed against Hernandez; their remarks encompassed all the argumentation put forth on the issue of punishment: [THE STATE]: Your Honor, may the record also reflect that the defendant has been charged in an indictment for robbery, and we used that prior conviction in that prior trip for twelve years as an enhancement count, Your Honor. So it changes the range of punishment from a second degree robbery to a first degree robbery, punishable by five to ninety-nine years, Your Honor. Your Honor, the defendant has been to the penitentiary before for twelve years. If you double that, that's twenty-four years, Your Honor. He also has picked up another felony conviction for robbery in the past, Your Honor, was placed on probation. But that also was a felony conviction. We would ask that you extend and add six more years to his punishment, and punish the defendant for no less than thirty years for robbery enhanced. MS. CHURCH: Your Honor, I think for this--a theft of $166 and a scuffle with a hurt nose is--thirty years is a bit outrageous for that. One of our problems with this case was his priors, and the rule of this Court, and I am going to ask that you consider the twelve years again, because he does have--he does have some problems. . . . . . . . THE COURT: I will give him twenty-four years TDC. (23) 2. The Trial Court Failed to Consider Full Range of Punishment The court of criminal appeals has held that "a trial court's arbitrary refusal to consider the entire range of punishment in a particular case violates due process." (24) "Due process requires a neutral and detached hearing body or officer. The Texas Constitution requires no less. Nonetheless, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary, we will presume the trial judge was a neutral and detached officer." (25) The presumption that the trial judge was a neutral and detached officer has been overcome in this case. Prior to trial, the trial court explicitly informed Hernandez of its intent to assess punishment by doubling his highest, previously imposed sentence, stating: "Whatever the highest one you have, I double. Okay?" (26) The trial court made it clear to Hernandez that it would be following its tradition of doubling a defendant's previous sentence, by directing him to "[a]sk the other prisoners in jail, they will tell you." The trial court's adherence to its sentencing policy was clear to the prosecutor and Hernandez's counsel--both of them discussed the trial court's policy in the course of debating punishment. Lastly, the trial court's imposition of a twenty-four year sentence conforms with its stated policy of doubling a defendant's highest, previously imposed sentence, which for Hernandez was twelve years. Based on these facts, it is clear that the trial court arrived at Hernandez's punishment by relying on an arbitrary mathematical formula, rather than a careful and fair consideration of the evidence relevant to punishment. This being the case, the trial court's conduct is not in accordance with the due course of the law because (1) it effectively excludes evidence relevant to punishment; (2) it precludes the court from considering the full range of punishment prescribed by law; and (3) it deprives the defendant of a fair and impartial tribunal at the punishment phase. (27) 3. Is the Trial Court's Error Waived? The rights of an accused are separated into three categories with regard to waiver of those rights: (1) absolute requirements and prohibitions which cannot be waived; (2) rights of litigants which must be implemented by the system unless expressly waived; and (3) rights of litigants which are to be implemented upon request. (28) "Rights which are waivable only, as well as absolute systemic requirements and prohibitions, cannot be made subject to rules of procedural default because, by definition, they are not forfeitable." (29) Accordingly, if we are to find, as the State suggests we should, that Hernandez waived the trial court's error by failing to object to his punishment at trial, we must first find that Hernandez is complaining of a right that falls into the third category articulated in Marin (i.e., that it is a right which is to be implemented upon request). In Blue v. State, the court of criminal appeals reversed a conviction based on comments made by the trial court during voir dire even though Blue failed to object at trial. (30) Specifically, the court was apologizing to a group of prospective jurors for their long wait and stated, among other things, the following: [This case] . . . is a situation where the attorney has been speaking to his client about what does he want to do. And when you are on the button like these cases, it's a question. Frankly, an offer has been made by the State or do I go to trial. And he has been back and forth so I finally told him I had enough of that, we are going to trial. You have been sitting out here and this is holding up my docket and I can't get anything done until we know if we are going to trial or not. Frankly, obviously, I prefer the defendant to plead because it gives us more time to get things done and I'm sure not going to come out here and sit. Sorry, the case went away and we were all trying to work toward that and save you time and cost of time, which you have been sitting here and I apologize about that. (31) A majority of the court concluded that the trial court's comments constituted reversible error despite Blue's failure to object at trial, although the judges did not agree as to the reason why. Four of the court's judges concluded that the trial court's statements tainted Blue's presumption of innocence and thus constituted fundamental error that required no objection. (32) Judge Keasler wrote a concurring opinion in which he agreed that Blue did not waive his complaint; he reasoned, however, that these statements showed partiality and thus violated Blue's absolute right to an impartial judge, stating: Regardless of whether a violation of the presumption of innocence is a violation of an absolute right, it is clear to me that the violation of the right to an impartial judge is an absolute right. The judge's comments in this case violated that right. . . . . . . . The trial judge went so far as to say that he would prefer that the defendant plead. Why else would a judge want a defendant to plead unless he had pre-judged the defendant's guilt? While we rarely see such statements as these, there will be a few cases where the judge's statements when viewed objectively are so egregious as to render him biased. This is one of those cases. No matter what the evidence was against him, Blue had a right to an impartial judge. The right to an impartial judge is so sacred that the United States Supreme Court has declared a violation of this right to be "structural" error. The presence of a biased judge on the bench is a structural defect in the trial mechanism. Although, as the dissent points out, there are some "structural" errors that can be forfeited, I do not think that the right to an impartial judge should be a right that the defendant can forfeit. This right should be included in the very select class of absolute rights. Furthermore, I believe that our prior cases holding an objection is required to preserve error are distinguishable from this case because the trial judge's comments were "so egregious" as to deem him biased, and because the right violated--the right to an impartial judge--is one of the absolute rights that do not require an objection under Marin. This case is highly unique and litigants should not view this holding as an invitation to appeal without making proper, timely objections. (33) Partly relying on Judge Keasler's concurrence in Blue, five courts of appeals have determined that the right to an impartial judge is an absolute requirement. (34) One of these courts, the First Court of Appeals, has observed that the right to an impartial judge articulated in Judge Keasler's concurrence should encompass a criminal appellant's complaint that a trial court refused to consider the full range of punishment. (35) We find that a defendant has an absolute right to an impartial judge not only when guilt and innocence are at issue, but also when punishment is at issue. Guided by Judge Keasler's concurrence in Blue and the First Court of Appeals' reasoning in Jaenicke, we further find that a defendant may complain for the first time on appeal about a trial court's refusal (i.e., lack of impartiality) to consider the full range of punishment--so long as the trial judge's conduct is so egregious as to deem the judge biased on the matter of punishment. (36) In the instant case, the trial judge's bias and partiality stemmed from her strict adherence to an ill-conceived mathematical formula that was meant to formulate a punishment that satisfied the interests of justice. No mathematical formula, however, can ever intelligently satisfy those interests. Moreover, the trial judge's comments were so egregious that they clearly evidenced the judge's bias on punishment. As previously stated, the judge told Hernandez, "Whatever the highest one [previous sentence] you have, I double. Okay?" The judge did not state that she "might," "may," or "would probably" assess Hernandez's punishment by doubling his highest previous sentence; rather, the judge made her intended plan for assessing punishment unequivocal. Accordingly, we reject the State's contention that Hernandez waived his complained-of error, and sustain Hernandez's third issue on appeal. IV. Conclusion The judgment of conviction for robbery is affirmed, but the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial as to punishment. (37) Consistent with this opinion, the trial court should reassess an appropriate sentence within the entire punishment range. LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ, Justice Publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b). Opinion delivered and filed this the 28th day of August, 2008. 1. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). 2. Id. § 12.42(b) (Vernon 2003). 3. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3. 4. See id. 38.1(e). 5. The State would only be barred from retrying Hernandez if this Court reversed on legal sufficiency grounds. 6. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(e). 7. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hampton v. State, 165 S.W.3d 691, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 8. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. 9. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Margraves v. State, 34 S.W.3d 912, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 10. Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). 11. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 12. Tex Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a). 13. Id. § 31.03 (Vernon 2003). 14. Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (Vernon 2003). 15. Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). 16. Id. at 787 (internal quotations omitted). 17. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(1). 18. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 2005). 19. Ms. Church was Hernandez's defense counsel. 20. Emphasis added. 21. Hernandez's Brief at 8. 22. Hernandez's Brief at 34. 23. Emphasis added. 24. Ex parte Brown, 158 S.W.3d 449, 456 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 25. Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, pet. dism'd) (citation omitted). 26. Emphasis added. 27. See Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361, 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref'd) (Guittard, C.J., dissenting). 28. Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 29. Id. 30. Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 129-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (plurality op.). 31. Id. at 130. 32. Id. at 132. 33. Id. at 138-39 (Keasler, J., concurring) (citations and footnotes omitted). 34. See Abdygapparova v. State, 243 S.W.3d 191, 209-10 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. ref'd); Gentry v. State, No. 06-05-00237-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2923, at *5 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr. 12, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Rodriguez v. State, No. 08-03-00497-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7746, at *11-12 (Tex. App.-El Paso Sept. 22, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Jaenicke v. State, 109 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd); Brooks v. State, No. 12-00-00118-CR, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2160, at *16-18 (Tex. App.-Tyler Mar. 20, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 35. See Jaenicke, 109 S.W.3d at 796; but see Brumit v. State, No. 07-03-0462-CR, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10893, at *4-6 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Dec. 2, 2004) (finding that appellant's failure to object at trial waived his right to complain about trial court's refusal to consider the full range of punishment, despite appellant's contention that the trial court's refusal constituted fundamental error), aff'd on other grounds, 206 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 36. See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 139 (Keasler, J., concurring). 37. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon 2006).

A review of the record shows that appellant did not introduce any evidence with respect to his plea.

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NUMBER 13-07-502-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG HUGO XAVIER DE LOS SANTOS, Appellant, v. DONNA JOHNSON, Appellee. On appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Nueces County, Texas. MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Vela Memorandum Opinion by Justice Vela This is an appeal from a trial court order striking appellant, Hugo Xavier De Los Santos's, pleadings as a sanction for discovery abuse. The judgment awards appellee, Donna Johnson, $4,699.50, plus interest, attorney's fees and conditionally awards appellate attorney's fees. By twelve issues, appellant complains of the trial court's sanctions order as well as the court's orders denying his motion to transfer venue, denying his plea in abatement, and denying his motion for continuance. We affirm. The Underlying Case Donna Johnson is a vocational rehabilitation counselor. Appellant is an attorney. Johnson filed a sworn account against appellant in 2005, to recoup fees she claimed she earned by serving as an expert in a medical malpractice case in which appellant was representing John Hess. The facts regarding Johnson's engagement are hotly disputed. For instance, appellant claims that Johnson solicited employment from him in San Antonio, even though it is undisputed that appellant first called Johnson, a Corpus Christi resident, for her assistance in the underlying medical malpractice action. The crux of appellant's claim is that he does not owe Johnson the money she claims she is owed for services performed. Appellant contends that Johnson agreed to look only to Hess, his client, for payment of her expert fees. Conversely, Johnson denies agreeing to look solely to the client for payment. Johnson also claims she was not told when appellant first called her on October 9, 2003, that he needed her to produce a report within twenty-four hours. Yet, she claims she prepared a report to meet the October 10 deadline, later traveled to San Antonio to meet with Hess, and prepared and forwarded appellant a supplemental report, dated May 17, 2004, along with her bill. Appellant sent additional medical records for her to review and Johnson contends she was asked to prepare for her deposition that was later cancelled. Appellant denied Johnson's claims, urging that she agreed to look to Hess for payment. He later expressed some dissatisfaction with the work she performed on the case. When he failed to pay the bill, Johnson filed suit against appellant for $4,699.50, for personal services she rendered. In response, appellant filed a motion to transfer venue to Bexar County, denied that there was an agreement between Johnson and him, and asserted affirmative defenses of estoppel, accord and satisfaction, laches, unreasonable and unnecessary charges, and limitations. Discovery Dispute The case was originally tried on May 3, 2006, and judgment was rendered for Johnson. Thereafter, the trial court granted appellant's motion for new trial. The reasons for granting the new trial are not discussed by either party in their respective briefs. After the new trial was granted, discovery disputes continued. One of the main disputes involved taking Hess's deposition. Another was an attempt to get the redacted engagement agreement between Hess and appellant. Johnson sought this portion of the agreement because appellant was refusing to pay her for her services based on appellant's purported agreement with Hess which required him to pay expenses of litigation. Although ordered to produce the redacted portion of the agreement in camera, he refused. The document, which formed the basis for appellant's decision not to pay Johnson, was never produced either as part of a confidentiality agreement, in an in camera inspection, or otherwise. After a year or more of disputes over various discovery matters, on March 26, 2007, the trial court held a hearing on Johnson's motion for sanctions. At the hearing, the court asked counsel for appellant if he brought the redacted portion of the engagement agreement to the sanctions hearing. The court swore appellant as a witness and asked him to specify the terms of the agreement. He refused, stating it was privileged. Counsel for appellant also agreed that the document or any portion of it was never produced for in camera inspection, even though production had been ordered. After allowing both sides to fully present their arguments, the trial court entered a lengthy order where it found the following violations, as well as others not discussed here: 1. Appellant had not complied with the trial court's discovery order of February 23, 2007 in several respects. 2. Appellant abused the discovery process by resisting discovery in filing responses, answers and objections that were unreasonably frivolous, including numerous objections raised by appellant in response to requests for production. 3. Appellant de-designated expert witnesses after his objections to requests for production had been overruled. The court found that appellant had designated six new experts, causing delay and needlessly increasing the cost of litigation. 4. Appellant failed to comply with the trial court's order of January 11, 2006, ordering production of specified documents described in an exhibit attached to that order. Appellant did not assert any privilege or tender any documents for in camera inspection. 5. Appellant falsely responded that he had no documents in response to requests for disclosure asking for the agreement between appellant and Hess regarding proceeds which have been escrowed to pay the claim and settlement agreement reached in connection with the Hess malpractice lawsuit. 6. Appellant consistently hindered the discovery process by failing to produce the original bill faxed to him by Johnson which would have shown the date he received it, failing to produce the redacted portion of the engagement letter allegedly obligating Hess for payment of expert witness expenses, failing to respond to direct questions from the Court about the agreement with Hess about the expenses, refused to hand over documents that criticized Johnson's work and refused to allow Hess to testify about any of the above referenced matters. The court found that the undisclosed documents were relevant in light of appellant's defense that he was not obligated to pay Johnson because the obligation was his client's. The trial court noted that appellant was an experienced attorney who was familiar with the litigation process and understood how discovery abuses can substantially increase the burdens on an adverse party, particularly in a controversy that was less than $5,000. The court also found that it had imposed lesser sanctions and that they had failed. For instance, the order states: 1. In an order dated January 11, 2006, the court ordered appellant to present himself for deposition at his cost. (1) 2. In an order dated January 30, 2006, the court denied appellant the right to introduce any documentary evidence that should have been produced in his deposition, but was not. 3. In an order dated January 22, 2007, the court ordered appellant to produce Hess for continuation of his deposition in Corpus Christi at appellant's additional cost, instead of San Antonio. The court also imposed the additional costs of the deposition and video services on appellant. 4. In an order dated February 20, 2007, the court reordered the deposition of Hess, production of the responsive documents and warned appellant that it was withholding further orders or sanctions pending a further hearing. The court ordered the sanctions pursuant to both the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the trial court's inherent power to sanction. Standard for Sanctions An appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004). A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to any guiding rules or legal principles. See id. at 839. An appellate court reviews the entire record, including the evidence, arguments of counsel, written discovery on file, and the circumstances surrounding the party's discovery abuse. Response Time, Inc. v. Sterling Commerce (N. Am.), Inc., 95 S.W.3d 656, 659 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002, no pet.). Discovery sanctions are authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215. If a party fails to comply with an order compelling discovery or abuses the discovery process, a trial court is authorized to strike the party's pleadings or render a judgment by default after notice and a hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b)(5), 215.3. Any sanction that adjudicates a claim and precludes the presentation of the merits of the case constitutes a "death penalty" sanction. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex.1992); TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex.1991). Discovery sanctions serve three purposes: (1) to secure the parties' compliance with the discovery rules; (2) to deter other litigants from violating the discovery rules; and (3) to punish parties who violate the discovery rules. Response, Inc., 95 S.W.3d at 660. Although the choice is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, the sanctions imposed must be just. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2; Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839; Response Time, 95 S.W.3d at 660. In order for a sanction to be just (1) it must have a direct relationship with the offensive conduct, i.e., it must be directed toward remedying the prejudice to the innocent party and (2) it must not be excessive, i.e., the trial court must consider the availability of less stringent sanctions and whether those lesser sanctions would promote full compliance. See Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; Response Time, 95 S.W.3d at 660. Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a party's claims or defenses unless a party's hindrance of the discovery process justifies a presumption that the party's claims or defenses lack merit. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 918. However, if a party refuses to produce material evidence, despite the imposition of lesser sanctions, the trial court may presume that an asserted claim or defense lacks merit and dispose of it. Id. Analysis By appellant's issues one through four, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in entering death penalty sanctions because there was no showing of discovery abuse, there was no direct relationship between the conduct and the sanction, the sanction was excessive and unjust, and the court did not consider lesser sanctions. The trial court's order enumerates numerous and specific incidents of discovery abuse, including violations of the trial court's prior orders and giving false answers to discovery. The relationship between the conduct and the sanction is clear. Appellant claims he did not owe Johnson the money. Rather, he claims that his client was to pay her expenses. Yet, he did not produce the document that would have shown, one way or another, what the agreement entailed. If the document was privileged, appellant should have either properly preserved the privilege or he should have produced the document in a manner to retain the privilege. He did neither. In addition, the sanctions order was directed to appellant's violation of multiple orders. The trial court's order was imposed directly on the offender, not his attorney for this dispute. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. Similarly, the trial court's sanctions were not excessive. The trial court's order set forth the instances wherein it had issued lesser sanctions. In Cire, the supreme court discussed that a lesser sanction may be an order charging all or a portion of the expenses of discovery on the disobedient party. Id. at 839. The trial court's order states that it was requiring appellant to pay deposition costs that would not ordinarily have been borne by him. Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the merits of a party's claim or defense unless the hindrance justifies a presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit. Id. at 839. Here, the trial court was not rash. It ultimately determined that appellant's conduct was flagrant and callous, but, the trial court did not award death penalty sanctions until many of its orders had been violated in a case that began as a simple sworn account to recover less than $5,000. Again, we find no showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Appellants's issues one through four are overruled. By appellant's fifth issue, he argues that the trial court erred in compelling the testimony of Hess, his client in the medical malpractice case. The record reflects that appellant entered into a Rule 11 agreement to produce Hess. Regardless, the trial court did not direct any sanctions against Hess, nor did the court grant or deny Hess any relief in the sanctions order. Even if the trial court erred in determining that appellant had the right to control Hess, there were numerous transgressions that supported the trial court's sanctions order against appellant. We overrule issue five. Appellant's six, seventh, and eighth issues urge that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Hess to produce documents, in denying appellant's rehearing of Johnson's motion to compel because the documents sought were privileged and in denying his request for an in camera inspection of documents it claims were privileged. From our review of the record it does not appear that appellant ever presented evidence to the trial court or initially tender documents to the trial court so that a determination with regard to privilege could be made. Once appellant made an in camera tender of only a few of the requested documents, it was clear to the trial court that the documents tendered were not privileged. Again, appellant never tendered the engagement letter or the redacted version of the engagement letter to the trial court for a determination of privilege. The record also shows that appellant was allowed an in camera inspection of documents. No abuse of discretion is shown. Appellant's sixth, seventh, and eighth issues are overruled. By appellant's ninth issue, he complains of the trial court's denial of his motion to transfer venue from Nueces County to Bexar County. Johnson, as the plaintiff, chose to file suit in Nueces County. Generally, venue is the plaintiff's choice. In Re: Continental Airlines, 988 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1988). Suit may be brought in any county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.002(a)(1) (Vernon 2002). Johnson's affidavit states that except for visiting with Hess in San Antonio, all activities were conducted in Nueces County. Considering the record as a whole, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to transfer venue. See id. § 15.064(b). We overrule issue nine. In issue ten, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his plea in abatement because his client, Hess, was an indispensable party. A review of the record shows that appellant did not introduce any evidence with respect to his plea. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plea. See Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988). The plea was also requested at a time when appellant had shown up for the first trial about forty-five minutes after trial was scheduled to began. Issue ten is overruled. By issue eleven, appellant urges that the trial court erred in making the monetary awards that it did. The amount awarded with respect to the sworn account was amply supported. Likewise, the attorney's fees in this case were awarded as sanctions, which does not require proof of reasonableness or necessity. Brantley v. Etter, 677 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1984); see also Condit v. Gonzalez, No. 13-04-426-CV, 2006 WL 2788251, *12 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, September 28, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Regardless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of fees it awarded. In issue twelve, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in granting his motion for continuance. There was no written motion filed of record. An oral motion unsupported by an affidavit will not satisfy the requisites of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251. Generally, when a movant fails to comply with rule 251's requirement that a motion for continuance be supported by affidavit, there is presumption that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. Villegas v. Carter, 722 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. 1986). Because appellant's motion did not comply with the rules of civil procedure, there was no abuse of discretion. Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. ROSE VELA Justice Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed this 28th day of August, 2008. 1. Johnson urges that appellant did not include several pertinent orders and hearings conducted by the trial court. Although we ordinarily presume those in favor of the trial court's order, we believe there is sufficient evidence before this Court, without taking those missing documents and hearings into consideration, to uphold the trial court's sanctions order.